Intelligence Summit, Part III: Generals and Fathers Never Die...

Stepping back from the Intelligence Summit (see Part I and Part II), it's hard not to be left with the impression of reunion of FOX News military commentators. In particular: Maj. General Paul Vallely (Army - retired 1993) and Lt. General Tom McInerney (Air Force - retired, 1994), co-authors (not coincidentally) of 'Endgame: The Blueprint for Victory in the War on Terror' - a book which we have not yet read. Also not coincidental we suspect, is the title of Thomas P.M. Barnett's book, published 18 months later: 'Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating' - a decidedly more liberal, if equally sweeping take on the same set of issues that we are currently reading, (albeit with great skepticism) and plan to comment upon at a future date. Alas, if only changing the world were as easy as the engineering task of building from blueprints. Another FOX commentator was Alireza Jafarzadeh, speaking in a smaller session on Iran, with pictures and fresh intelligence to back up his thoughts. More on that in another post.

Vallely spoke Saturday afternoon (Feb. 18th). McInerney spoke Monday over lunch. Vallely was colorful and fascinating, peppering his talk with current anecdotes from what is clearly an active set of contacts with current military personnel and government figures across a wide range of issues. Though both filled their talks with numbers - adding an air of credibility, McInerney seemed physically frail and somewhat robotic in his delivery.

Our overall impression (of McInerney) was of someone frighteningly out of touch with what's gone on since his retirement. He focused almost exclusively on air power uber alles military engagement scenarios for Iran. All of them were to take a day - two at most. All ended with a massive, miraculous and utterly mysterious internal 'uprising' to overthrow the country's leadership. None were to involve any U.S. or allied 'boots' (except perhaps a few special forces) ever crossing the border. OK, we can agree with that. The goal: setback of Iran's nuclear program, preferably by five years. Again, fine. But how we are to assess the achievement of that goal - when estimates of where they are right now vary by at least as much - was left unaddressed. Who's going to do the post-bombing assessment when the pre-bombing assessment is so uncertain?

For the record, we know that Iran must be dealt with. Very very soon. They must not be allowed to have nuclear weapons because of their clear and repeatedly stated intent to use them against us and our allies. Yet if McInerney's limited view were the extent of our strategic thinking on how to achieve that, we'd be moving to Punta Arenas - tomorrow. Thankfully it's not. He noted that "neither hope nor denial is a strategy" but went on to talk about "sending a signal to the resistance" inside Iran - a wing and a prayer for regime change as a second goal to which we'll give half-hearted support.

Left hanging in the air were questions such as: What signal? What resistance? What are disgruntled Iranians supposed to do with such signals if they receive them? And how are they to recognize them and know what to do? How are we to coordinate with them - and they with themselves? What resources do they have at their disposal? How are they to evade Iran's internal security apparatus? (something which McInerney dismissed as insignificant compared with Saddam's... which hardly means that it's insignificant).

Questioned sharply by a member of the audience on specific plans for coordination with the resistance, McInerney proposed arming and funding the MEK - the Mujahedin-e Khalq - a troubled and troubling idea, to say the least, even if all the other options are worse. The questioner noted (on what authority we don't know) that backing the MEK is also impractical as they are hated by the Iranian people. Unfortunately, this suggestion also fits into the pattern that's started to emerge on the ground since the conference - that of an increasingly 'hot' war between Iranian proxies inside Iraq and the elected government there (implicitly including us).

Despite really wanting to believe him - wanting to believe that a neat solution on Iran is possible - we were left with a strong feeling of no good options and (even worse) 1990 Desert Storm deja vu... which of course was McInerney's last great triumph before going off to work for a series of defense contractors. To be fair, maybe that's the best we can hope for - a strong military signal that we ain't foolin' around and a real setback to the nuclear program (whether we can measure it or not), followed by several years of tense standoff with the mullahs - years that would look much like the last few. A reprieve. A temporary remission. A trimming of the tumor - though not its full removal.

McInerney did make some good points, but for the most part, they were poorly integrated with the bigger picture. Had he been on the stage with Richard Perle (whose talk we partially blogged yesterday), we suspect he would have seemed like the dunce in the class. Passive voice was used (always a trigger for our BS detector): "action must be taken now". Well, yes. And then, seeming to contradict that idea: we "must have a coalition" ...that includes Arab states. Hunh? And how many years is that going to take? In that context however, the UAE ports deal makes a lot more sense. Take a small risk in order to win another local ally and counter the enemy's assertion that the world is arrayed against the U.S. and Israel alone. (We're still up in the air on the ports thing, but leaning towards the position that it's the right deal with utterly inadequate planning for how to win over the conventional wisdom of American people.)

What 43 may have learned from Iraq is that 41 may have been right... at least to a point. That dealing with Iran will have to be different. That speed and a coalition will somehow have to be reconciled rather than traded off: "this will not stand" plus a broad international blessing. The signs are there. George W. Bush may be learning - if only through the school of hard knocks - what his father had the luxury of doing at a more leisurely pace. The son may be finding the truth in the quip by Mark Twain that:

"When I was a boy of 14, my father was so ignorant I could hardly stand to have the old man around. But when I got to be 21, I was astonished at how much the old man had learned in seven years."

UPDATE: Welcome Pajamas Media readers! Those interested in the Saddam tapes should also have a look at this post on Georges Sada's observations from Saddam's inner circle.