I find Steven Pinker simultaneously challenging and short-sighted, as in this recent piece in Time magazine. The man is clearly a pioneer in his field--brilliant as both researcher and clear communicator of cutting-edge neuroscience discoveries and ideas.
Unlike Dawkins or Dennett, who deal with related subject matter (but who invariably cause me to roll my eyes with their dark and angrily simplistic anti-religious agendas) Pinker always causes me to think more deeply. I can disagree with his larger conclusions and still accept his findings. I am often enlightened by them. He seems to come closer than either of the other two to true scientific humility. (Those two words--'scientific' and 'humility'--used to go together far more naturally.) And then he belies that impression.
Pinker is delicate almost to the point of apology in the Time piece in approaching an existential subject to which he too is subject: the nature of being. And yet he like others, is too constrained by the silo in which he studies and by an over-arching set of unstated personal assumptions to come to anything but a depressingly reductionist hypothesis: man as meat. Where he really runs off the rails is in attempting to spin this all into a new secular morality. Thankfully, he puts in enough qualifiers to render moot some of his most passionate arguments.
The Hard Problem is explaining how subjective experience arises from neural computation. The problem is hard because no one knows what a solution might look like or even whether it is a genuine scientific problem in the first place. And not surprisingly, everyone agrees that the hard problem (if it is a problem) remains a mystery...
[Nonetheless] consciousness does not reside in an ethereal soul that uses the brain like a PDA; consciousness is the activity of the brain... scientists have amassed evidence that every aspect of consciousness can be tied to the brain... when the physiological activity of the brain ceases, as far as anyone can tell the person's consciousness goes out of existence. Attempts to contact the souls of the dead (a pursuit of serious scientists a century ago) turned up only cheap magic tricks, and near death experiences are not the eyewitness reports of a soul parting company from the body but symptoms of oxygen starvation... [emphases added here and throughout]
What he
should have said in order to stay within the bounds of his expertise is that
as far as any scientist can determine by current experiment, the person's consciousness is removed from the realm in which the consciousness of the observer ordinarily dwells.Pinker dismisses out of hand--as he should given the scientific frame in which he operates--the copious anecdotal evidence for out-of-body experiences in which highly specific details of the resuscitation scene were reported from vantage points 'impossible' for the subject to have occupied even if s/he were conscious. Not to mention the vivid dialogues with long-dead relatives, the sense of choice, etc. Near-death experiences are hardly reducible to a walk towards a bright light, as Pinker seems to suggest.
Yet Pinker would ignore or reduce the importance of such reports. His reference to "cheap magic tricks" while valid in reference to much 19th-century showmanship is overly sweeping, causing me to question where else in the article he may have strayed from his core expertise without my being aware of it. It also hardly needs saying that Pinker is neither an historian nor a theologian (nor a bunch of other things) and thus he is unwilling to make reference to the ample evidence for eternal life provided by other domains.
Scientists play a key role in helping us to understand created things; however, leaving the understanding of the nature of our being (origin, purpose, meaning and destiny) solely to scientists is like fielding a baseball team made up entirely of second basemen. In that vein, two books are worth noting: 1) Lee Strobel's
"The Case for Christ" and 2)
William F. Buckley Jr.'s 1951 classic, "God and Man at Yale"
which I'm reading right now.
Part of our current one-discipline-at-a-time (and the narrower the better) approach to such cosmic questions lies in the fragmentation of the university. It used to be all about the search for literally "unity in diversity" (before the term 'diversity' got completely perverted to mean the kind one can see in a picture, i.e., of viewpoints, expertise, etc.). This is a point that rock-star Christian apologist
Ravi Zacharias is fond or reminding his listeners.
Today the university is more about specialization, all residing (as Buckley presciently pointed out in 1951) within a framework that is now fundamentally self-referential. That is to say, the university has given up altogether on any pretext that is purpose lies in the search for any higher pattern or meaning in our observations of creation. If there is no God to perceive, then everything we might seek to understand is only about what He has created, not Himself. Separating the two has never made sense to me--a major reason why I view the Creationism vs. Darwinism debate as foolish on its face: God would be rather limited if he weren't capable of creating processes that appear natural and time-bound to us yet which He can know the end of.
Pinker continues:
To appreciate the hardness of the Hard Problem, consider how you could ever know whether you see colors the same way that I do. Sure, you and I both call grass green, but perhaps you see grass as having the color that I would describe, if I were in your shoes, as purple. Or ponder whether there could be a true zombie--a being who acts just like you or me but in whom there is no self actually feeling anything...
No one knows what to do with the Hard Problem. Some people may see it as an opening to sneak the soul back in, but this just relabels the mystery of "consciousness" as the mystery of "the soul"--a word game that provides no insight...
Whatever the solutions to the Easy and Hard problems turn out to be, few scientists doubt that they will locate consciousness in the activity of the brain. For many nonscientists, this is a terrifying prospect. Not only does it strangle the hope that we might survive the death of our bodies, but it also seems to undermine the notion that we are free agents responsible for our choices--not just in this lifetime but also in a life to come. In his millennial essay "Sorry, but Your Soul Just Died," Tom Wolfe worried that when science has killed the soul, "the lurid carnival that will ensue may make the phrase 'the total eclipse of all values' seem tame."
Notice what Pinker has done here, which even the most literalist religionists seldom do for themselves. He has set up science, and particularly scien
tists, as a kind of priesthood, entirely separate from everything and everyone else. It's an assumption that's easy to pass over without noticing in our technlogy-transfixed society. An unstated implication of that assertion is that science has a lock not only on truth but on the
all-encompassing truth.
In other words, Pinker is attempting to surround all other science and thought with his own: brain science. That gives him a handy counter-argument to any critic: i.e., that s/he cannot get outside of his/her brain any more than Pinker can and thus it's all about who has the better one. By labeling all non-scientists as "terrified", he also sets himself up in a superior position to argue that the rest of us are only reasoning from fear. He alone is calm, fearless and above it all.
Now here's where it gets really interesting:
My own view [says Pinker] is that this is backward: the biology of consciousness offers a sounder basis for morality than the unprovable dogma of an immortal soul. It's not just that an understanding of the physiology of consciousness will reduce human suffering through new treatments for pain and depression. That understanding can also force us to recognize the interests of other beings--the core of morality.
Again, Pinker is going beyond his domain of expertise to make an assertion about others. In an age gone by, he would instead be learning about them and attempting to incorporate them, not dismissing them out of hand and elevating his own to the pinnacle of reason. His notion of a soul seems flat, i.e., it either exists inside oneself as an illusion (his position) or outside as a "ghost in the machine" (a favorite phrase of his). Having consulted for years on computer architectures, it doesn't seem all that difficult to imagine instead a more nuanced middle ground: a 'soul' that's just as complex and brain-bound as Pinker suggests
AND that has an enduring component we cannot perceive. This is much as one might walk up to a computer and be unable to distinguish between data, programs and processes stored, run and/or backed up locally versus remotely. (Any combination could be possible... some mysteries are impenetrable.)
He goes on to equate dogs with people because they both have brains and then to reveal the true nature of his "new morality" (and his completely misunderstanding of faith) by doing the moral equivalence "thing":
And when you think about it, the doctrine of a life-to-come is not such an uplifting idea after all because it necessarily devalues life on earth. Just remember the most famous people in recent memory who acted in expectation of a reward in the hereafter: the conspirators who hijacked the airliners on 9/11.
Yep. Anyone who believes in life after death is uniquely prone to being a mad bomber... not like us rational, scientific secularists, no sir! It's remarkable that, having just trashed the ability of the brain to ponder higher order outside itself, he has the chutzpah to argue for an unproven morality by saying "...when you think about it". As if the rest of us haven't--and found our own thought wanting... desperately in need of an eternal Thinker not constrained by a brain at all.
(It's worth noting in passing that Pinker never really disproves the notion that, having dissected the immensely complex computer of the human brain, he may still have failed to perceive a kind of biological "wireless modem" that operates on principles we have not yet discovered. If the concept of the Holy Spirit lent itself to a
purely biological explanation I would be disappointed yet if it also incorporated biological
mechanisms I would not be surprised. And having failed to disprove such an extra-dimensional hypothesis, his call to a "new morality" is more than a little bit hasty and inadequately grounded.)
One could argue all day with who is doing the asserting here and who is being dogmatic, flying off into a debate about what constitutes proof... and get nowhere. Instead, I'll leave off with this:
Many other social scientists, psychologists and philosophers have created (sometimes inadvertently, sometimes not) "new moralities" based on emerging but not yet fully fleshed-out theories (some more scientific than others). Darwin, Freud and Marx come to mind.
These views of human nature have all
seemed credible or at least interesting to many at the time--and then been taken farther than they should have by others. (Some, like Das Kapital, should never have made it out of editing). Sadly, the history of the 20th century is littered with the misery wrought by grand experiments with real human beings built upon such unproven "makes sense to me" foundations.
Pinker would do well to start observing human nature, history, experience and social institutions more honestly and humbly outside the narrow confines of his laboratory. Teams made up entirely of second basemen aren't all that effective. Sometimes they are dangerous.
UPDATE: One other thing occurred to me that’s so obvious I missed it on a first pass.
Pinker’s assertion that “the biology of consciousness offers a sounder basis for morality than the unprovable dogma of an immortal soul” is entirely without reference. If we can assume that (at least in a Christian frame) a lack of an eternal soul implies a Godless universe (for Pinker), then
how can he say what is moral and what is not?It’s not a peripheral or academic question. Pinker (or anyone) must stand outside of his humanity and his brain in order to make such a claim or else resort to disproven naturalism. He makes reference to the supernatural without ever intending to do so.
Morality is not self-evident from birth and Pinker leaves that Rousseau-esque (and utterly incorrect) notion of the noble savage hanging. He seems to say that it (morality) stems from natural instinct and evolved, adaptive social processes, enhanced by a strange kind of intellectually derived empathy at realizing (thanks to Pinker, et al) that other beings will eventually be scientifically proven to be sentient. Some of us already figured that out and it is not deterministic. E.g.,
yes, I now know that homeless person is sentient. So what? I'm busy.The sweep of history should be enough to prove naturalist morality suspect in its claims to being benign, as should the experience of parenting. (Children must be taught not to hit one another. Pointing out the personhood of the one being hit is insufficient so long as the child realizes that it is all about extracting all the pleasure s/he can out of this life.)
Others have tried to argue for a natural, source-less morality that one can derive
de novo, independent of God. And they have failed. (I watched a VH1 documentary on the late 60s rock scene over the weekend and it was incredibly sad. Man seems to have a need to re-invent his morality every few generations with predictably disastrous long-term consequences.)
Pinker does no better. His appeal to morality depends (without his giving credit) on a shared sense of morality that traces its roots to at minimum a religious ethic and more specifically to the Judeo-Christian foundations underpinning the culture in which he lives and works. Yeah, I know the Greeks were involved too. So were the Romans. Guess who they turned to
en masse in the first milennium?